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STUDENT NOTES
COMMERCE CLAUSE v. COAL
SEVERANCE TAXATION
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,' the United States
Supreme Court held2 that although a state's coal severance tax3
is subject to commerce clause4 scrutiny, the Montana tax5 meets
commerce clause requirements for state taxes affecting interstate
commerce. In addition the Court ruled that Montana's coal
severance tax does not contravene the supremacy clause,6 as it
is neither inconsistent with, nor preempted by, any federal
statutes.
Like most states, Montana raises revenue by levying a
severance tax on minerals produced within its borders. Under
Montana's coal severance tax statute as amended in 1977, the rate
of taxation on the coal "produced"8 is determined by the coal's
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
2 Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White and Rehnquist joined. A
dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Powell
and Stevens. Justice White filed a separate opinion in which he concurred with
the result of the majority. Id.
I A severance tax is "a levy assessed at a flat or graduated rate by a govern-
ment on the privilege, process or act of commercially severing or extracting natural
resources . . . and measured by the physical amount or the gross net value of
the natural resource produced or sold." Lockmer, The Economic Effect of the
Severance Tax on Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 468,469 (1965).
"Congress shall have the power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes .... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
' MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-101 to -111 (1981).
' The "Constitution and the Laws of the United States .. . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .. " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
' The first such tax was imposed by Michigan in 1846, see U.S. DEPT OF
AGRICULTURE, STATE TAXATION OF MINERAL DEPOSITS AND PRODUCTION (1978), and
by 1979, 33 states had adopted some form of severance taxation. See BUREAU
OF CENSUS, STATE GOV'T. TAX COLLECTION IN 1979, Table 3 (1980).
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value, energy content, and method of extraction.' On high quality
surface mined coal the tax may reach a maximum of 30 percent
of the "contract sales price."10
This coal severance tax was initially challenged by four Mon-
tana coal producers and eleven out-of-state utility company
customers in a consolidated action brought in the Montana District
Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought a declara-
tion that the coal severance tax unconstitutionally burdened in-
terstate commerce and frustrated federal policies. The plaintiffs
also requested a refund of over 5.4 million dollars, the amount
of tax paid under protest and an injunction against continued
collection of such taxes. The District Court upheld the validity
of the tax and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of
Montana.
In regard to the commerce clause issue, the Montana Supreme
Court ruled "without hesitation" that Montana's coal severance
tax did not violate the principles protected by the commerce
clause, because "the severance of coal was a taxable event that
preceeds [sic] entry to interstate commerce."" The court went
' MONT. CODE ANN. 5 15-35-103 (1981). Severance tax-rates imposed-
exemptions.
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in
accordance with the following schedule:
Heating quality Surface Underground
(Btu per pound Mining Mining
of coal):
Under 7,000 12 cents or 5 cents or
20% of value 3% of value
7,000-8,000 22 cents or 8 cents or
30%/ of value 4% of value
8,000-9,000 34 cents or 10 cents or
30% of value 4% of value
Over 9,000 40 cents or 12 cents or
30% of value 4%/ of value
'Value' means the contract sales price.
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case
shall be used at each point on this schedule.
(3) A person is not liable for any severance tax upon 20,000 tons of the
coal he produces in a calendar year.
'o "Contract sales price" is defined as "the price of coal extracted and prepared
for shipment F.O.B. mine, excluding that amount charged by the seller to pay
taxes paid on production- .. " MONT. CODE ANN. S 15-35-102(1) (1981).
I Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615 P.2d 847, 854 (Mont. 1980).
[Vol. 841124
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on to state that "even if the commerce clause had obtained, plain-
tiffs could not have prevailed...""
The appellants' contention that the supremacy clause pro-
scribed the tax was similarly unconvincing to the Montana court.
The court found that "there has been no preemption by the federal
government in the field of coal severance taxation, nor any na-
tional policy derived from Congressional enactments pursuant to
the constitution with which the Montana coal severance tax is
in conflict." 3
DISCUSSION
With regard to the commerce clause, the Montana court
characterized the severance of coal as an instrastate activity
preceeding entry into the stream of interstate commerce. This
reasoning, based upon many early United States Supreme Court
decisions, is representative of a pattern of thought which served
well during a time when the distinction between interstate and
intrastate activities was believed to be crucial to the protection
of a states' power to tax because the prevailing doctrine accord-
ed interstate commerce an absolute immunity from state taxation."
Two guideposts in constitutional adjudication of state taxa-
tion of natural resources were first articulated in Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co." The first principal holds that states possess wide
latitude in their classification of resources for tax purposes. Thus,
coal tax schemes which treated one type of coal differently from
another were held to survive fourteenth amendment challenges. 6
Under the second principle, facially nondiscriminatory state taxes
on energy resources which have not entered the stream of interstate
commerce are held to be beyond the purview of commerce clause
protection.'7 The fact that virtually all of the taxed resource is
" Id. at 854.
Id. at 861-62.
"See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, CASES
AND MATERIALS 304 (4th ed. 1978).
" Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). See also Hope Natural
Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1928); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923).
,1 Id. at 254.
" Taxes which explicitly discriminate against interstate commerce are,
however, held to be invalid. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
1982] 1125
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destined to be shipped out-of-state is deemed but an "adventitious
consideration."18 Thus, if any energy resource tax was found to
fall on interstate rather than local activity, then that tax would
yield to the commerce clause. 9 Severance taxes, however, con-
sistently survived commerce clause challenges because the act of
production was held to be remote from interstate commerce."0
This analysis is illustrated in Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,2
where a taxpayer whose iron ore was affected by a severance
tax alleged that a substantial portion of such ore would travel
out-of-state. Consequently, he contended the tax unconstitutionally
burdened interstate commerce. The Court met his contention with
an unequivocal statement:
Plainly the facts do not support the contention. Mining is not
interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing is a local business
subject to local regulation and taxation .... Its character in
this regard is intrinsic, is not affected by the intended use or
disposal of the product, is not. controlled by the contractual
engagements, and persists even though the business be con-
ducted in close connection with interstate commerce ....
The underlying principles announced in these early cases have
been refined to some extent, but for the most part have remained
ifitact. ' "During the 60 years since Heisler, the Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of the commerce clause. The Heisler
distinction between coal severance taxation and other forms of
taxation having the same economic effect, has been criticized as
"mechanical" and "unsatisfactory. 26
The United States Supreme Court recognized this criticism
Heisler, 260 U.S. at 343.
See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949); Utah Power and
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923).
2 262 U.S. at 178.
= Id. at 178-79.
2 See Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961); Utah Power and Light Co.
v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930).
" Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 274 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942).
' Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
Business; 75 HARV. L. REv. 953, 970 (1962).
26 R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 510 (2d ed. 1977).
1126 [Vol. 84
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in Commonwealth Edison. The opinion clearly asserts that a state
tax does not escape commerce clause scrutiny simply because it
is thought to fall on a purely intrastate activity.' The Court went
on to note the corresponding proposition that a state tax is not
rendered invalid per se merely because it is levied on interstate
commerce.2
In reviewing challenges to state taxes under the commerce
clause, the Supreme Court has expressed the need for establishing
"a consistent and rational method of inquiry focusing on the prac-
tical effect of the challenged tax."' Such an inquiry was held in
Commonwealth Edison to be appropriate in the case of state
severance taxation challenges, notwithstanding the claim that
the imposition of the tax was on goods prior to their entry into
interstate commerce. Hence, Heisler's formalistic determination
of the point of entry into interstate commerce is no longer of para-
mount concern.' The Commonwealth Edison Court concluded that
the more sophisticated analysis expounded in Complete Auto Tran-
sit v. Brady"' is the proper mode of commerce clause evaluation
of coal severance taxation.
21 101 S. Ct. at 2952; see also Hunt v. Washington Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 350 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970); Nip-
pert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423-24 (1946).
" 101 S. Ct. at 2952; see also Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of
Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 735 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1976).
101 S. Ct. at 2953, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425, 443 (1980); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978);
Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 743-51 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1976).
w The Commonwealth Edison Court stated quite plainly that it disapproved
of any contrary statements in Heisler and its progeny. 101 S. Ct. at 2953.
, In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 278 (1976), the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Mississippi tax on the privilege of doing
business in that state. The tax was applied to Complete Auto Transit, Inc., a
Michigan Corporation engaged in the business of transporting motor vehicles by
motor carrier. The vehicles so transported were shipped from Michigan to Jackson,
Mississippi where they were loaded onto trucks belonging to Complete Auto Tran-
sit, Inc. who then delivered the vehicles to Mississippi Auto dealers.
Under the test articulated in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602 (1961), taxes on the privilege of doing interstate business were deemed violative
of the commerce clause. The Complete Auto Transit Court, however, overruled
Spector and announced that the practical economic effects of the challenged tax
must be examined by using a four part test which looks to:
1) whether the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
1982] 1127
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Under the four part Complete Auto Transit test, a state tax
does not offend the commerce clause so long as it:
1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing state;
2) is fairly apportioned;
3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and
4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state.2
The recent cases upholding this four part test' have reinforced
the principle that a state has a significant interest in "exacting
from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state
government. '
The Montana coal severance tax can easily withstand attack
under the first two prongs of the test. The nexus between the
extraction of a state's coal and the state itself is undeniable for
"[the entire value of the coal before transportation originates in
the State; and the mining of coal depletes the resource base, and
wealth of the State, thereby diminishing a future source of taxes
and economic activity."36 The second inquiry, the fairness of the
apportionment of the severance tax, does not apply because
"[t]here is no danger of multiple taxation, for no other state can
tax the severance."
37
Under the third and forth parts of the test, however, the Mon-
tana tax is subject to challenge. The third prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test is clearly not satisfied by taxes which express-
ly distinguish between intrastate and interstate commerce so as
to discriminate against the latter. Such facially discriminatory
with the taxing state;
2) whether the tax is fairly apportioned;
3) whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce; and
4) whether the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the tax-
ing state.
430 U.S. at 279. The Mississippi tax was held to meet this standard.
430 U.S. at 279.
435 U.S. at 735.
' Id. at 448.
In fact the Supreme Court noted that "[a]ppellants do not dispute that
the Montana tax sitisfies the first two prongs . . ." 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2954. The Montana Supreme Court observed that "... a substan-
tial, in fact the only, nextis of the severance of coal is established in Montana."
615 P.2d 847, 855 (Mont. 1980).
I Commonwealth Edison v. State, 615 P.2d 847, 855 (Mont. 1980).
1128 [Vol. 84
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taxes are decidedly out of step with the commerce clause. 8 In
the case of facially neutral taxes, however, the question is closer.
Montana's severance tax affects "each ton of coal produced
in the state' 39 regardless of the coal's destination. Thus, on its
face, the tax is neutral. It is argued, however, that because 90
percent of Montana's coal is purchased and consumed by out-of-
state utility companies,0 the brunt of her severance tax ultimate-
ly falls on the residents of other states.4' Indeed with regard to
coal destined for export it has been said that a severance tax has
"exactly the same operational effect . . . [as] if it had been ex-
acted at the boundary line of the state as an express export
duty."42 In a more graphic description, a severance tax has been
likened to a "tollgate lying athwart a trade route ... condition[ing]
access to natural resources. 4 3 Access so conditioned, however,
does not demonstrate discrimination, as the "commerce clause
balance tips against the tax only when it unfairly burdens com-
merce by exacting more than a just fair share from interstate
activity."4
In the case of facially ndndiscriminatory taxes, the discrimina-
tion argument can be reduced to the contention that "a state in
a position to enact a levy on its energy resources that is passed
on to out-of-state consumers violates the commerce clause when
it imposes a tax greater than necessary to recoup the costs
associated with the extraction of that mineral."45 From this point
of view, facially nondiscriminatory taxes become vulnerable under
the third prong if it can be shown that the practical operation
3 See, e.g., Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
3 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103(1) (1981).
" 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
" "While this is ultimately a question of fact, economic theory indicates that
a number of conditions must be met before such shifting is likely to occur, in-
cluding the absence of an alternative source of supply for the commodity (or its
substitute) .... [Tlhis casts doubt on the presumption that such taxes are
automatically shifted forward, and suggests that the factual predicate underly-
ing the argument be critically examined .. " Hellerstein, Constitutional Con-
traints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT. TAX J. 245,248
(1978) [Hereinafter Hellerstein].
" 260 U.S. at 252.
" Developments in the Law- Federal Limitations on State Taxation of In-
terstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 970 (1962).
" 435 U.S. at 748.
" Hellerstein, supra note 41, at 253.
1982] 1129
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of the tax is to discriminate against interstate commerce. 6 Because
it has long been recognized that interstate commerce, too, must
&&pay its way",47 the gist of the discrimination argument appears
to lie not in the tax per se, but rather in the magnitude of the
tax. Observing this shift in logic, the Commonwealth Edison Court
noted that "appellants' discrimination argument ultimately col-
lapses into their claim that the Montana tax is invalid under the
fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test: that the tax is
not fairly related to the services provided by the State."48
Coal severance taxes fall into the larger category of general
revenue taxes. 9 As such, even unreasonable or unduly burden-
some taxes are not barred by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.50 Moreover, general revenue taxes collected
from a particular activity need not reflect the value of the ser-
vices provided to that activity under the due process clause; for
"[a] tax is not an assessment of benefits,"'' but is rather a means
of distributing the cost of government.2
The Commonwealth Edison Court noted the broad latitude en-
joyed by the states under the due process clause, and found such
latitude was not "somehow divested by the commerce clause mere-
ly because the taxed activity has some connection to interstate
commerce; particularly when the tax is levied on an activity con-
ducted within the state."- The Court suggested that any other
, "[N]ot all burdens on [interstate] commerce, but only undue or
discriminatory ones are forbidden." Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,
425 (1946).
" New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338,
351 (1929).
,' 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
Although a substantial portion of the revenue collected under the Mon-
tana severance tax is deposited into a trust fund intended to care for future genera-
tions, MONT. CODE ANN. S 15-35-108(1) (1981), the Montana Supreme Court has found
the tax to be "imposed for the general support of the government." Commonwealth
Edison v. State, 615 P.2d 847, 856 (Mont. 1980).
1 See, e.g., Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
51 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937).
"Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are
used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them, and would involve
the abandonment of the most fundamental principle of government-that it ex-
ists primarily to provide for the common good." Id. at 522-23.
' 101 S. Ct. at 2957.
1130 [Vol. 84
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position on this issue would confer upon interstate commerce an
unwarranted competitive edge over those affairs conducted on
a purely local level.'
Although the commerce clause requirement of a fair relation-
ship between the interstate business activity and the tax does
not divest a state of its broad taxing power, it would appear to
invalidate unduly burdensome or unreasonable taxing practices;
and at least to that degree constrain legislative prerogatives. In
determining the propriety of taxing interstate activity, however,
the Court declared in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,5  "[tihe simple
but controlling question is whether a state has given anything
for which it can ask return.""5 Thus, the Court looks not to the
quantum of services provided to the taxpayer, but only to the
fact that he is indeed serviced. The fourth part of the Complete
Auto Transit test is envisioned by the Commonwealth Edison
Court as a refinement of the first part. Part one requires "the
interstate business to have a substantial nexus with the State
before any tax may be levied on it," 5 while part four "imposes
the additional limitation that the measure of the taxes be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact.""8
The Court's role in determining the existence of this relation-
ship doubtlessly sparked debate in the Supreme Court Conference
Room; but, as evidenced by the Commonwealth Edison dissent,
the Justices could not be brought to agreement. The dissenters
would remand, and instruct the lower court to conduct a factual
inquiry with regard to appellant's allegation that the Montana coal
severance tax bears no reasonable relationship to the services pro-
vided by the state. The majority, however, believes a taxpayer
becomes amenable to taxation by way of his enjoyment of the
"fruits of civilization."59 Once assured that the taxpayer has
received this constitutional entitlement, the majority defers to
5 Id.
311 U.S. 435 (1940).
Id. at 444.
ST 101 S. Ct. at 2958.
s Id.
5 Examples of such fruits are: the privilege of mining coal, the use of state
roadways, the use of a trained work force and countless state services such as
fire and police protection. The Court also noted that interstate commerce may
be required to contribute to all governmental service," including those services
from which it arguably receives no direct benefit." Id. at 2959 n.16.
1982] 1131
9
Voegelin: Commerce Clause v. Coal Severance Taxation
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
legislative judgment regarding the measure of the tax. If the
measure of the tax is based on a percentage of the value of the
coal produced, the severance tax is "in 'proper proportion' to ap-
pellants' activities within the State and, therefore to their conse-
quent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the
State has afforded.""0 Hence, the majority deems severance taxes
in fair relation to the services provided by the state so long as
the tax is assessed in some proportion to the taxpayers' activities
within that state;6' and impliedly, any proportion is a fair
proportion.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell
and Stevens, argues that such an interpretation "emasculates the
fourth prong."" For, "[no trial will ever be necessary on the issue
of fair relationship so long as the State is careful to impose a pro-
portional rather than a flat tax rate."' The majority rule was fur-
ther dubbed no less "mechanical" than the Heisler Court's ap-
proach, of which the majority ostensibly disapproved.
From the dissenters' vantage point, the commerce clause is
violated when a state selects "a class of out-of-state taxpayers
to shoulder a tax burden grossly in excess of any costs imposed
directly or indirectly by such taxpayers on the States." 5 Hence,
the successful challenger to a severance tax must meet the for-
midable evidentiary tasks of proving both the tax is indeed pass-
ed on to out-of-state consumers, and that the amount of the tax
shifted forward is "manifestly disproportionate" 7 to the costs at-
tributable to coal production.' Conceding that such a trial would
require "complex factual inquiries," the dissenters believe the task
must. be undertaken as the "case poses extremely grave issues
that threaten both to 'polarize the nation,' and reawaken 'the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization' that the Commerce
Clause was designed to remedy." 8 In response to these issues,
10 101 S. Ct. at 2958.
Id.
Id. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63 Id.
64Id.
Hellerstein, supra note 41, at 249.
66 Id.
101 S. Ct. at 2969 n. 13 (Blackmum, J., dissenting).
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the dissenters perceive the role of the Court as providing a
mechanism for judicial disapproval of excessive, unduly burden-
some or unreasonable state taxes.
The majority, however, focuses on the measure of the tax,
and in so doing restricts the role of the Court because "the ap-
propriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for
legislative, and not judicial, resolution."69 The majority fears a
more expansive view of the Court's role would inevitably lead
to the prescription of a "test for the validity of State taxes that
would require state and federal courts, as a matter of federal Con-
stitutional law to calculate acceptable rates or levels of taxation
of activities that are conceded to be legitimate subjects of
taxation."7 This view seems to be grounded in the Court's recogni-
tion that legislative bodies are endowed with fact finding abilities
superior to those of the judiciary. As such, legislatures are uni-
quely positioned to synthesize disjointed economic data into the
comprehensive tax plans from which a state government's life
blood flows.
CONCLUSION
Commonwealth Edison represents a significant departure from
the traditional approach to coal severance taxation under the com-
merce clause. Because the act of severing coal from the earth is
no longer deemed antecedent to the commencement of interstate
commerce, coal severance taxes have become amenable to com-
merce clause challenges. When so challenged, the four part Com-
plete Auto Transit test provides the standard by which severance
taxes will be appraised.
The Montana coal severance tax, when scrutinized in light
of Complete Auto Transit, does not interfere with trade among
the states so as to violate the commerce clause. The tax clearly
satisfies parts one and two of the Complete Auto Transit test.
7'
The requirement of part three is met because the tax imposed
is a function of the amount of coal produced without regard to
any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumption
"9 Id. at 2959, citing Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252
(1929); Cf. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Magnano Co.
v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
70 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
"' See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
1982] 1133
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thereof. Compliance with part four of the test can only be at-
tributed to the fact that the measure of the tax is calculated as
a percentage of the value of the coal extracted, and as such, is
deemed in "proper proportion"72 to the coal producer's activities
within the state.
The Court's implicit proposition that all proportions are pro-
per proportions is troublesome to those seeking logic in the law;
for the question of a fair relationship between the tax and the
services provided by the state is'left begging by the bare asser-
tion that th tax is proportional. One is haunted by the query
of whether a state legislature's decision to impose a 100 percent
coal severance tax would pass constitutional muster.
Such decisions, however, are neither left to caprice nor made
in a political vacuum. They reflect a myriad of legislative con-
siderations ranging from present day economic conditions to the
fulfillment of a government's obligation to posterity. In the final
analysis, it appears to be the nature of these considerations, and
the fact finding process underpinning the determination of accep-
table taxation rates, which lead to the conclusion that such ques-
tions are best left to the political process.
Wray Victor Voegelin
' General Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441.
[Vol. 841134
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